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Viime vuosisatojen aikana maailman hyvinvointi ja kansainväliset suhteet ovat laajalti 
edistyneet energiatuotannon resurssien ja teknologian vaikutuksesta. Energiatuotanto ja 
vesiresurssien hallinta ovat usein toisistaan riippuvaisia ja viime vuosikymmenien tehos-
tetun energiatuotannon jäljiltä monet alueet kärsivät nyt vesipulasta ja maailmanlaajui-
sesti fossiilipolttoaineresurssit vähenevät entisestään. Koska energia ja vesi ovat niin tii-
viissä vuorovaikutussuhteessa ja vaikuttavat meidän hyvinvointiimme sekä globaaliin 
suhteisiimme, on ratkaisevaa ymmärtää tätä vuorovaikutussuhdetta paremmin. Tässä 
työssä tutkin tätä suhdetta tarkastelemalla miten nykyinen energiakauppa Kiinan ja Ka-
zakstanin välillä vaikuttaa rajanylittävään Ili-Balkhash valuma-alueeseen ja miten suun-
niteltu synteettisen luonnonkaasun tuotanto alueella voi vaikuttaa sekä valuma-aluee-
seen että valtioiden välisiin suhteisiin. 
 
Tässä työssä päättelen että näiden kahden valtion välinen energiakauppa ruokkii väestön-
kasvua, maahanmuuttoa sekä kulutusta alueella. Tämä kehitys lisää sekä vedenkäyttöä 
että saastumista tarkastetussa valuma-alueessa. Kauppakumppanuus dominoi valtioiden 
välstä suhdetta, ja tämä asetelma ei anna tilaa vesiproblematiikan keskusteluun. Tulen 
myös johtopäätökseen että synteettisen luonnonkaasun tuotanto alueella tulee kulutta-
maan Ili-Balkhash valuma-alueen vesiresursseja entisestään ja voi toimia merkittävänä 
ympäristöongelmia generoivana tekijänä. Tämä uusi energiatuotannon menetelmä tulee 
vähentämään Kiinan riippuvaisuutta Kazakstanin energiakaupasta ja tämä voi vuoros-
taan avata valtioiden suhdetta siten että ne pystyisivät keskustelemaan vesiresursseja 
koskevista kysymyksistä. 
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Abstract 
 
For the past couple of centuries global affluence and relations have largely been driven by 
the resources and methods of energy production. Energy production and water resources 
management are often decidedly dependent on one another and after the intensified en-
ergy production of the past decades many regions now find themselves water scarce and 
many fossil fuel resources are dwindling globally. As energy and water are so closely in-
terlinked and affect our wealth and our global relationships, it is crucial that we under-
stand their linkage better. In this thesis I will examine that linkage by studying how the 
current energy trade between the P.D.R. China and Kazakhstan affects the transboundary 
Ili-Balkhash watershed indirectly and how the planned synthetic natural gas development 
in the region can affect both the watershed and the existing relation between the coun-
tries. 
 
In the study I conclude that the energy trade between the two states fuels population in-
crease, immigration and consumption in the region. This development increases both wa-
ter use and pollution of the watersheds in the studied watershed. The trade partnership 
creates a relationship between the states, which leaves no room for discussion of these 
issues. I also conclude that the production of synthetic natural gas in the region will de-
plete the Ili-Balkhash watershed further and it can act as a major source of pollution of 
the watershed. This new form of energy production will also lessen China’s dependency 
on Kazakhstan for energy trade and this can free up their relations to such a level that 
discussions regarding water resources can be possible again. 
 
 
Keywords Water resources, energy trade, energy production, water stress, Central Asia 
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1 Introduction 
 
Energy production and water resources management are in a great many cases closely 
dependent on each other, whether the method of choice is hydropower, coal, oil, gas or 
any other one. With the insecurity facing the fossil fuel supply around the world, alter-
native methods of power productions are being developed. Simultaneously there are 
global concerns of rising temperatures due to greenhouse gases as well as more local 
fears of water scarcity and the method and intensity of energy production plays a major 
part in solving both issues. The world has already for decades been in a situation where 
economic affluence and global relations have been largely driven by the resources and 
methods of energy production. Now we are facing a time where the availability and 
management of water resources plays a similar role. Energy and water are two of the 
main sources of wealth, and keepers of peace, on the planet and they are closely inter-
linked. This study will aim to present a part of that linkage through examining the fol-
lowing case. 
 
In a region largely relying on its energy production to attain economic growth (Dorian 
et al., 1997a), Kazakhstan is enjoying more visibility than ever before (Hug and Zhang, 
2010). Large findings of natural gas, coal and especially oil fuel the economy of the na-
tion, Kazakhstan being the wealthiest among Central Asian nations by quite some mar-
gin (Dorian, 2006). Along Kazakhstan’s eastern border lies the Chinese state of Xin-
jiang, also known as the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. The ethnically diverse 
state plays an important role in Chinese economy through, among other factors, its en-
ergy resources, including coal, oil and natural gas (Malhotra, 2013) as well as its ties 
with Central Asia (Clarke, 2011). 
 
The economic and political ties between the Central Asian Republics (CARs) and China 
are developing with exceptional intensity (Dodonov, 2010) and China is today the num-
ber one economic actor and main source of foreign investment in the five states (Mari-
ani, 2013). The Chinese interest in Kazakh energy export is one of the key drivers of 
this development (Saurbek, 2008),but also other reasons play a role. The tightening of 
ties between China and Central Asia provides China with relief in its long-playing secu-
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rity issues in Xinjiang as well as a means with which to integrate Xinjiang with the Chi-
nese heartland (Clarke, 2011). Simultaneously Central Asia is strategically becoming 
more important and both external and internal actors are pursuing power in the region, 
acting as yet another incentive for intensified Chinese – Kazakh relations (Blank, 2012, 
Clarke, 2011).  
 
This relationship is now being tried due to the nature of energy flowing in one direction 
and water flowing in the opposite. Some of Kazakhstan’s largest rivers and most valua-
ble water resources enter the country through Xinjiang, one of the largest being the Ili 
river (Houshower, 2009). The Ili river is heavily utilized upstream of the border in Xin-
jiang, to such an extent that water depletion poses a problem along its course in Kazakh-
stan (Sievers, 2001). Rapid development and immigration from the Chinese heartlands 
to Xinjiang will put further pressure on this resource in the future (Allouche, 2007). The 
terminus of the Ili river lies in Lake Balkhash (Yedilbayev and Shokanova, 2012), a 
lake now in danger of facing the same fate as its well-known neighbor, the Aral Sea 
(Allouche, 2007). Loose agreements do exist to control trans-boundary water manage-
ment between the two constituents (Allouche, 2007) but such are the relations between 
the countries that Kazakhstan has chosen not to take an aggressive stance in the matter 
(Sievers, 2001).  
 
Due to its significant and affordable reserves of coal, Xinjiang is a centre in the devel-
opment of synthetic natural gas, or SNG, in China (Huo et al., 2013). The SNG project 
was commissioned in China because of the high demand and its insufficient resources 
of natural gas (Li et al., 2014). In the production of SNG coal, and in some cases bio-
mass, is gasified and then converted to methane, the main component of natural gas 
(Chandel and Williams, 2009). Among the positive effects of an SNG-industry are a 
lesser dependency on fossil fuel imports, an opportunity to cut down on greenhouse gas 
emissions and larger global reserves as well as a longer expected availability of the raw 
material (Kopyscinski et al., 2010), especially the first two are seen as important issues 
in contemporary China (Ding et al., 2013). SNG production is extremely water intensive 
and the development of the SNG-industry in Xinjiang will result in less available water 
both in the state itself as well as in downstream Kazakhstan (Huo et al., 2013). Moreo-
ver, the production process results in significant amounts of pollution in the form of 
wastewater and water residue (Huo et al., 2013). 
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In this article I want to investigate two parallel relationships, that between the politics of 
energy and water as well as that between the states of Kazakhstan and China. To under-
stand these issues further I wish to answer two questions that merely have been 
broached in earlier studies. How does the oil trade, and resulting relationship, between 
Kazakhstan and China (Xinjiang) indirectly affect the water resources in the area? And 
what effects will the emerging SNG technology in Xinjiang have on the relations be-
tween the two countries and their respective water resources? These questions are im-
portant to answer in order to foresee the environmental challenges faced in this rapidly 
developing area and to prevent an environmental disaster, but there is also a less obvi-
ous reason for asking these questions. The relationship between the two states is largely 
dependent on the flows of energy and water and answering these two questions is there-
fore crucial in the understanding of future power relations and the political stability of 
Central Asia.  
 
I have chosen the Ili-Balkhash system as a geographical frame to review these ques-
tions. This is due to the central role of the Ili-Balkhash as a water resource both in Xin-
jiang and in Kazakhstan as well as the watershed being chosen as the main area of de-
velopment of SNG production in Xinjiang. This study is conducted as a literary review 
of material covering energy policy, environmental and water resources issues in Ka-
zakhstan and China (Xinjiang) as well as relations between the two states.  
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2 Relations 
 
In this chapter, I will investigate the relationship between China and Kazakhstan. I will 
look at how their ties became so strong, what their current relationship looks like and 
why energy trade plays such a big part on their common agenda. 
 
China’s interest in relations with the Central Asian republics is partly founded in the 
battling of separatism in Xinjiang and the shared geographic vicinity, religion and eth-
nicity between the CARs and the Uighurs of Xinjiang (Dorian et al., 1997b). Ethnic ine-
quality between privileged Han-migrants and the indigenous Uighur population has 
sparked tension over the past decades (Wu and Song, 2014) and the Chinese govern-
ment fears Uighur separatism, terrorist attacks and Islamic radicalism (Millward, 2004).  
China is continuously encouraging the relocation of millions of Han Chinese to Xin-
jiang. This massive immigration has created further tension between the ethnic groups 
in Xinjiang (Howell and Fan, 2011). It has also led to a rapidly growing need of food 
and labour which in its turn takes a toll on the water resources of the arid state (Sievers, 
2002). 
 
Concern of security was one of the main reasons for China to instigate the Shanghai Co-
operation Organization (SCO) in 2001 (Ong, 2005) together with Kazakhstan, Uzbeki-
stan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Russia (Aris, 2009). The SCO has grown into an or-
ganization that also tackles economic and cultural exchange and the Chinese govern-
ment is using this platform to gain influence in Central Asia (Ong, 2005), especially Ka-
zakhstan (Steiner, 2013). With the developing and opening up of Central Asian markets 
(Fedorenko, 2013) and the withdrawal of US troops from the region in 2014 (Mankoff 
and Kuchins, 2013) the great powers of the world are now competing for influence and 
economic power among the republics (Kim and Indeo, 2013). This “New Great Game” 
of Central Asia also brings an unprecedented opportunity for the Central Asian repub-
lics themselves in tapping into international markets, improving infrastructure and en-
suring domestic security as these deals help the more or less totalitarian regimes of the 
Central Asian republics to stay in power (Blank, 2012). 
 
After the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia’s role as the leading outside power of the 
region has weakened considerably (Spechler and Spechler, 2013) while the US launched 
its “New Silk Road” strategy as a plan to sustain regional security after the withdrawal 
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of US troops from Afghanistan in 2014 (Kim and Indeo, 2013). The US government re-
alizes that China and Russia (and possibly India) will retain most influence in the region 
and that the role of the US should be to knit together regional security and cooperation 
arrangements (Mankoff and Kuchins, 2013) so as to simultaneously counteract Islamic 
militancy and lessen the CARs dependence on either Russia or China (Kim and Indeo, 
2013). 
 
China on the other hand is gaining the upper hand among the two great foreign powers 
of Central Asia, pushing Russia aside into a less influential position (Blank, 2012). 
China is not only a significant trade partner among the CARs but also an influential one 
and the authoritative regimes of the republics largely see China as a guarantor for stay-
ing in power (Kim and Indeo, 2013). Large quantities of energy are needed to fuel the 
rapid development of China (Lai, 2002) and securing this resource from right across the 
border coincides with China’s interests of regional dominance and stability (Clarke, 
2011). Kazakhstan is not only in this partnership for the economical profits gained from 
the energy trade and a complex cooperation has emerged with China, including also ge-
opolitical interests and political collaboration (Saurbek, 2008).  
 
Both the production and use of energy in Kazakhstan is dominated by fossil fuels (Du-
lambayeva et al., 2013). Kazakhstan is among the world’s leading oil producers (Pala-
zuelos and Fernández, 2012) and its neighbour China is the second largest oil consum-
ing country in the world (Saurbek, 2008). According to the Kazakhstan Chamber of 
Commerce (2011), China is now the leading export partner of the country with a share 
of 17.1% of all Kazakh exports. The value of this trade is expected to grow steeply over 
the upcoming years (ING Financial Services, 2012) with oil constituting 60% of the 
revenue. The main pipeline between Kazakhstan and China was China’s first transna-
tional oil-pipeline in 2006 and recently expanded in 2013. It is considered for further 
expansion pending the development of new oilfields in Kazakhstan. Oil import from 
Kazakhstan is only expected to rise in China in the future but simultaneously China is 
developing the production of Synthetic Natural Gas (SNG) from coal. The major part of 
this production is planned to take place in Xinjiang and will be presented later in this ar-
ticle (U.S. energy information administration, 2015). Currently the coal industry is un-
derdeveloped in Xinjiang and the coal industry is cited as the biggest projected provider 
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of new jobs in the near future with the SNG production industry being the main em-
ployer (Xiao et al., 2014). 
 
Kazakhstan’s economic success is dependent on the flow and demand of oil (Palazuelos 
and Fernández, 2012). Trade is not the only reason Kazakhstan sees good relations with 
China as essential. Border security and the political and economic model of China as a 
centralized state is to the liking of the Kazakh government (Hug and Zhang, 2010). 
With Russian power dwindling (Blank, 2012) and the West hit by recession and keen on 
seeing political reform in Kazakhstan (Hug and Zhang, 2010), China is seen as an at-
tractive and greatly influential partner by Kazakhstan (Blank, 2005). In the upcoming 
chapter I wish to research how these strong relations affect the trans-boundary water re-
sources between Kazakhstan and China. 
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3 Water – How Kazakh Chinese relations influence wa-
ter resources 
 
The Ili has its origin in the Tien Shan of central Xinjiang, the mountains gathering the 
moisture entering Xinjiang and ensuring a precipitation in the eastern Ili Valley that is 
about seven times greater than that of Xinjiang as a whole (Shen et al., 2013). Almost 
all of the water of the Ili originates in Xinjiang (Sievers, 2001), from both rainfall and 
glacial melting in the Tien Shan (Kezer and Matsuyama, 2006). The river is mainly 
used for the irrigation of agriculture, especially in Xinjiang (Stone, 2012) and has been 
utilized already for decades by the Soviet, Chinese and Kazakh people to such an extent 
that water supply issues and pollution are well known issues along its course (Sievers, 
2001). Due to the low precipitation and a high estimated evaporation the river serves as 
the main source of water for a large number of the local inhabitants on both sides of the 
border (Zuo et al., 2013). 
 
 
Figure 1: The Ili River, Lake Balkhash and their positions within Kazakhstan and Xinjiang, China 
(Del Pietro, 2007) 
 
The Ili river empties into lake Balkhash and provides a great majority of the water flow 
into the lake (Kezer and Matsuyama, 2006). Lake Balkhash located in Southeaster Ka-
zakhstan is one of Central Asia’s largest closed inland basins (UNDP, 2004). The water 
resources of the lake are mostly used for irrigation, industry and water supply and in ad-
dition to this Balkhash supports one of the most important fisheries of Kazakhstan 
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(Kezer and Matsuyama, 2006). The water balance of the lake mostly depends on the in-
flow and evaporation and due to this context the lake has suffered from declining water 
levels and pollution already for decades as the Ili River has been increasingly utilized 
and polluted (UNDP, 2004). 
 
Xinjiang is one of the most water-stressed regions in the world (Shen et al., 2013) and 
water constraint is considered to be the main hindrance for development as the correla-
tion between water consumption and per capita GDP is high by Zuo et al. (2013). Water 
infrastructure and irrigation is one of the principal areas of development in China’s 
Western Development Program (Lai, 2002) and the coordination of water use is the pri-
mary focus of Xinjiang’s Leapfrog Development of the 12th five year plan, laying a 
foundation for further socio-economic development (Zuo et al., 2013). As the develop-
ment of the state is partly driven through the encouragement of immigration, water de-
mand is on the rise (Sievers, 2002). Irrigation stands for over 90% of the water con-
sumption in Xinjiang but water consumption in manufacture and construction is ex-
pected to almost double between 2010 and 2020 (Zuo et al., 2013).  
 
Water diversion from the Ili River in Xinjiang is already lowering the water level of the 
river across the border in Kazakhstan and is a major concern in a large part of the coun-
try (Stone, 2012). The diversion is expected to increase over the upcoming years (Mus-
tafina, 2014). Climate change is expected to bring more precipitation to the Ili basin but 
glacial melting in the Tien Shan Mountains would simultaneously diminish the dis-
charge over time, resulting in a natural discharge lesser than at present (Stone, 2012). 
The possible increase of diversion of water from the Ili River on the Chinese side of the 
border is considered a national security risk by the Kazakh government and this issue 
may become one of the most critical issues in the relationship between the states 
(UNDP, 2004). An earlier example of this is the Chinese diversion of the Irtysh River’s 
water for the Black Irtyish – Karamay canal (Mustafina, 2014). This canal diverts 
roughly half of the water of the Irtysh on the Xinjiang side of the border. Yet China did 
not notify Kazakhstan nor Russia, as downstream riparian countries, of the building of 
this canal before its completion (Sievers, 2002). 
 
To date China has not signed any international treaty on the use of trans-boundary rivers 
(Mustafina, 2014). The strengthening of relations between China and Kazakhstan both 
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when it comes to trade and security and the Chinese Western Development Program do 
not go hand in hand with Chinese intentions in its water-policy with Kazakhstan (Siev-
ers, 2001). In 2001 the two states signed “an agreement to facilitate cooperation on 
trans-boundary water management including the Ili” (Allouche, 2007). The states have 
held regular meetings on the theme but so far there has been no agreement on yearly 
water allocations. Kazakhstan proposed selling heavily subsidized food to China in ex-
change of a commitment of an unimpeded flow of the Ili on the Chinese side. China 
turned down this proposal (Allouche, 2007). Kazakhstan has chosen not to aggressively 
confront China on matters regarding the use of water resources. The risk of these diver-
sions is both an inter-state conflict and a domestic one within Kazakhstan, due to a po-
tential feeling of negligence perceived by the affected population in regards to the gov-
ernment (Sievers, 2001). The Kazakh government has recognized water stress as one of 
the most pressing questions of national security (UNDP, 2004). 
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4 Synthetic Natural Gas Production in Xinjiang 
 
As energy demands are steadily rising all over the world the reserves of our traditional 
sources of energy, oil and natural gas, are dwindling (Kopyscinski et al., 2010). Alterna-
tive methods and sources for energy production are being considered as a result and 
synthetic natural gas (SNG), a method that has been off the table for decades, is now be-
coming economically viable again (Chandel and Williams, 2009). There are several 
commercial SNG projects around the world under various stages of development, some 
of the biggest ones being located in Xinjiang. SNG can be produced from two different 
raw materials of quite different character, coal and biomass (Kopyscinski et al., 2010). 
The use of biomass, as a carbon neutral fuel, in the production of SNG makes it an en-
ergy technology reasonably low on greenhouse gas emissions (Chandel and Williams, 
2009). In this chapter we will however examine the production of SNG from coal as this 
is the method relevant for our geographical area. 
 
Synthetic natural gas production from coal also has many obvious upsides. The SNG 
production process from coal is capable of achieving low levels of sulphur, mercury and 
nitrogen oxide emissions if the by-products are treated accordingly (Chandel and Wil-
liams, 2009). Available coal reserves are expected to last for another 150 years com-
pared with the reserves of oil and natural gas which are predicted to be used up within 
the next 40 – 60 years (Kopyscinski et al., 2010). Coal is also more evenly distributed 
on the surface of our planet compared with oil and natural gas. The development of 
SNG production from coal would therefore increase energy security and help in stabiliz-
ing the global fuel market (Chandel and Williams, 2009). 
 
To the cons of SNG production from coal can be counted the emissions of CO2, which 
are larger than those of the direct use of either coal or natural gas as a fuel. This is due 
to the production process where coal is refined to SNG (Chandel and Williams, 2009). 
Life cycle CO2 emissions are considerably higher than “all competitive pathways” 
(Ding et al., 2013). The economic viability of SNG production is dependent on several 
volatile factors, such as the price of not only coal but also all other raw materials and 
technologies used to produce energy, the price of energy and politics regarding CO2 
emissions as well as the possible use and price for CO2 harvested in the process (Chan-
del and Williams, 2009). Another notable con of SNG production is its water intensity 
(Huo et al., 2013) which we will return to later in this chapter. 
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The commercial process of producing synthetic natural gas from a solid carbon source 
starts with the gasification of the coal using steam and oxygen (Kopyscinski et al., 
2010). The result is a mixture of a number of gases called syngas (Chandel and Wil-
liams, 2009). The syngas needs to be cleaned of impurities and after that it is condi-
tioned into the form that is most useful for its purpose, e.g. fuel production. Condition-
ing of the syngas is achieved through a step called the water-gas shift reaction. In the 
water-gas shift reaction CO and H2O are converted into CO2 and H2 (Kopyscinski et al., 
2010). After this the conditioned syngas goes through the methanation process where 
CH4, methane, is produced in a fixed-bed catalytic reactor while steam is added to re-
duce coke formation. This is now the finished SNG product that is ready for use as a 
fuel in power plants or transportation. There are two alternative processes of converting 
coal into SNG and more are being developed and researched but this process is the only 
one currently in commercial use (Chandel and Williams, 2009). 
 
China has for decades been struggling with urban airborne pollution, a phenomenon that 
can largely be explained by rapidly increasing energy demand, the dependency on elec-
tricity production from coal and a growing pool of vehicles (He et al., 2002). To allevi-
ate this serious hazard to health and environment the Chinese government has effi-
ciently promoted the use of natural gas and renewable sources in energy production. In 
2012 natural gas was the source for 5.3 % of consumed energy in China with a steady 
yearly increase. China signed trade partnerships in 2012 with a number of countries, in-
cluding Kazakhstan, to meet the demand of natural gas (Li et al., 2014). China’s own re-
sources of natural gas are very limited while about one third of global coal resources are 
located in the country (Huo et al., 2013).  
 
In 2013 the Chinese government initiated a strong support of the production of SNG 
from domestic coal resources (Yang, 2015). According to Ding et al. (2013) there are 30 
major SNG projects under development or planning in China and the projects in Xin-
jiang would stand for about 64 %, of the total production (Ding et al., 2013). Xinjiang 
has been chosen as the major centre of China’s SNG development as it has almost half 
of the nations coal resources. The development of SNG production in Xinjiang will 
lessen China’s dependence on foreign fuel imports (Yang, 2015). 
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The production of SNG from coal puts pressure on the environment in two major ways, 
by using water and by polluting the environment. The process of producing one ton of 
SNG from coal consumes about 6-7 tons of water (Huo et al., 2013). With a planned 
yearly production of 77 billion m3 of SNG in Xinjiang, the pressure on the local water 
resources would be on a scale of 3.23 – 4.85 x 108 m3, representing around 0.5 – 1% of 
the yearly consumption of water in Xinjiang. The only region of Xinjiang with both ad-
equate water and coal resources for the production of SNG is the Ili basin. This concen-
trates the effects on the environment of SNG production on a limited geographical scale, 
that never the less spans two countries. Pollution is by some experts (Huo et al., 2013) 
seen as an even more severe challenge for the environment. Waste “such as chemical 
and biological sludge and phenol containing wastewater” (Huo et al., 2013) are a result 
of the SNG production process and according to studies conducted in the Ili region, the 
enterprises are not being sufficiently rigorous with environmental protection. 
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5 Discussion 
 
The Chinese plans of SNG production have the possibility to make a large impact on 
many levels, not just in the producing centre of Xinjiang but also further afield in Ka-
zakhstan as well as the Chinese heartland. As presented before, these impacts can be 
both positive and negative and in this chapter I will focus on a couple of topics to an-
swer the questions presented in the beginning of this paper. How does the oil trade, and 
resulting relationship, between Kazakhstan and China (Xinjiang) indirectly affect the 
water resources in the area? And what effects will the emerging SNG technology in 
Xinjiang have on the relations between the two countries and their respective water re-
sources? 
 
The oil trade between Kazakhstan and China helps develop Xinjiang, and the develop-
ment of Xinjiang strengthens the relationship between Kazakhstan and China. As pre-
sented by Clarke (2011) this trade and deepened relationship between the two states 
plays a significant role in stabilizing and developing the autonomous region of Xinjiang. 
Growing prosperity and stability results in, and feeds off, a large-scale immigration 
from Eastern China as observed by Howell and Fan (2011). These factors increase the 
consumption of food, energy, clothing and other commodities that heavily rely on local 
water resources. Zuo et al. (2013) argue that the economic growth of Xinjiang is espe-
cially tied to water consumption.  
 
China is at present Kazakhstan’s most valuable partner, both economically and politi-
cally. Kazakhstan is heavily reliant on the revenue from its oil-trade with China. The 
similarities in their political systems make China a model as well as guarantor for the 
sitting government of Kazakhstan. According to a report by UNDP (2004) Chinese di-
version of water from the Ili basin is recognized as a matter of national security in Ka-
zakhstan but there is no legal framework to fall back on. Thus, I argue that Kazakh-
stan’s only means by which to tackle the issue at present would be vociferous opposi-
tion. The relationship between the two states however appears to tone down the criti-
cism that Kazakhstan presents to China on the matter, as has previously been presented 
by Allouche (2007). Consequently, I conclude that importing oil from Kazakhstan to 
China and the development of ties between the two states leads to a decrease in availa-
ble water in transboundary watersheds on both sides of the border. 
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The Ili River has seen diminished flows over recent years and there are fears of the river 
laying bear during parts of the year, as previously voiced by Stone (2012). Huo et al. 
(2013) argues that the SNG production is a water intense method of energy production. 
According to the study the SNG facilities are being developed in the Ili region of Xin-
jiang due to the combination of a secure water source, the Ili River. However, I believe 
that there will be an additional pressure on water resources as the development of SNG 
production indirectly will affect the use of water through its generation of jobs, wealth, 
immigration and eventually consumption in the region. Consequently, I argue that there 
will be a measurable difference in the discharge of the Ili due to the SNG development. 
Together with the already diminishing discharge this will affect the environment, liveli-
hoods and economy of the Ili basin. 
 
Pollution in the form of spillwater from the SNG production facilities will likewise put 
pressure on the Ili system. Huo et al. (2013) argue that the water remaining in the Ili can 
become harmful to use, as has happened in many other rivers in Central Asia. Lake Bal-
khash, the terminus of the Ili, has seen a deterioration of its ecosystem due to the utiliza-
tion of the Ili River according to studies by Allouche (2007) and the UNDP (2004). 
These studies argue that as the lake is emptied only through evaporation it means that 
lower inflows will mean drastically sinking water levels as evaporation levels remain on 
the same level regardless of the lessened inflow. Allouche (2007) fears that Lake Bal-
khash is facing the same fate as its neighbour, the Aral Sea. I argue that these studies 
prove the fragility of the Ili-Balkhash system and that further pressure brought on by 
SNG production will have a deteriorating effect on Lake Balkhash. The lessening in-
flow and rising pollution levels will lead to larger concentrations of pollutants in the 
Lake, however I will not venture to evaluate the scale of this development. 
 
The production of SNG will however have effects far beyond the impact it will have on 
water resources. China is in great need of alleviation of its air pollution problems that 
are a matter of public health, especially in its eastern heartland. Li et al. (2014) argue 
that SNG has the potential to alleviate these issues as the primary source of air pollution 
from energy production is moved away from the affected areas. On the other hand Ding 
et al. (2013) & Chandel and Williams (2009) present that the global impact in the form 
of greenhouse gases is negative as a whole as the production and use of SNG produces 
more gases compared with the traditional use of coal as a source of energy. From these 
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studies I conclude that the local environmental problems of eastern China would be alle-
viated by the development of SNG production, while the global environment as well as 
the environment in Xinjiang and Kazakhstan would suffer from it. 
 
China is aiming to be more self-sufficient in its energy production and SNG as a new 
source of energy will lessen the nation’s dependence on imported fuels as mentioned by 
Yang (2015). I argue that there is a large possibility that this will significantly lessen the 
import of oil and gas from Kazakhstan. This in turn would lessen Kazakhstan’s depend-
ency on Chinese good will. I conclude that if taken in terms of water resources it can 
give Kazakhstan greater reason to oppose the excessive use and pollution of their shared 
water resources. 
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6 Conclusion 
 
In this article I chose to investigate two parallel relationships, that between the politics 
of energy and water as well as that between the states of Kazakhstan and China. To un-
derstand these issues further I answered the two following questions.  
 
I examined how the oil trade, and resulting relationship, between Kazakhstan and China 
(Xinjiang) indirectly affect the water resources in the area. Through reviewing available 
material I conclude that importing oil from Kazakhstan to China fuels population in-
crease, immigration and consumption. This development increase both water use and 
pollution of the watersheds in the studied Ili-Balkhash watershed, as well as wider in the 
region. The trade also serves as the main grounds for a relationship between the two 
states where the Kazakh government does precious little to pressure the Chinese govern-
ment into addressing the issue. There is a lack of regulatory framework to address this 
issue on legal grounds.  
 
In this study I also reviewed what effects the emerging SNG technology in Xinjiang 
will have on the relations between the two countries and their respective water re-
sources. I conclude that the planned SNG production in Xinjiang will help develop Xin-
jiang further and so strengthen the harmful impact of development on the trans-bound-
ary watersheds. In addition, the process of producing SNG from coal is very water in-
tense and will further deplete the available water resources, mainly the Ili-Balkhash sys-
tem. The pollution of the production process combined with the diminishing water lev-
els will raise the concentration of pollutants in the Ili-Balkhash system. 
 
The production of SNG will strengthen the Chinese self-sufficiency of energy and 
therefore lessen its dependence of energy imports, likely also from Kazakhstan. I argue 
that this has the potential of worsening the relations between Kazakhstan and China due 
to water disputes paired with lesser economic relations. Kazakhstan may become more 
vociferous in its protests against the Chinese use of the trans-boundary watersheds but 
without legal framework there is no guarantee that there will be a reaction to these cries. 
 
Due to the findings above I conclude that the Ili-Balkhash system is facing hard times. 
The water depletion and pollution can make the river unusable for at least parts of the 
year, which heavily will alter the way of life in Eastern Kazakhstan. This can potentially 
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destabilize the country. Lake Balkhash is already facing the same fate as its better 
known cousin, the Aral Sea. With lesser inflows paired with higher concentrations of 
pollutants it is likely that the lake will become even more polluted than at present, and 
slowly disappear.  
 
I argue that there needs to be a regulatory framework in place governing the use of the 
trans-boundary waters between China and Kazakhstan to stop this development and to 
address future issues. For this to become reality Kazakhstan will have to raise its voice 
more than it has so far. As the SNG development has the potential of lessening the two 
states’ dependency on each other it also opens a window for discussion. What the Ili-
Balkhash system needs is an open discussion between the two states as well as the local 
population and industries to put a framework for water-use in place. Ironically this 
strengthening of legal ties could be achieved by the weakening of economic ties. 
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